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Abstract
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issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5489
This paper is about the importance of the information 
in Public Credit Registries (PCRs) for supporting and 
improving banking sector regulation and supervision, 
particularly in the light of the new approach embodied in 
Basel III. Against the backdrop of the financial crisis and 
the existence of information data gaps, the importance 
of complete, accurate and timely credit information in 
the financial system is evident. Both in normal times 
and during crises, authorities need a device that allows 
them to look at the universe of credits in a detailed and 
readily way. And more importantly, they need to develop 
tools that exploit as much as possible the information 
therein contained. PCR databases contain individual 
credit information on borrowers and their credits which 
makes it possible to implement advanced techniques that 
This paper—a product of the Finance & Private Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to strengthen credit reporting systems in Latin America and the Caribbean under the Western 
Hemisphere Credit Reporting Initiative (WHCRI). Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at mggirault@bcra.gov.ar and jhwang1@worldbank.org. 
measure banks’ credit risk exposure. It allows optimizing 
the prudential regulation ensuring that provisioning 
and capital requirements are properly calibrated to 
cover expected and unexpected losses respectively.  It 
also permits validating banks’ internal rating systems, 
performing stress tests and informing macroprudential 
surveillance. In this respect, it is envisioned that the 
existence of a PCR will be a key factor to enhance the 
supervision and regulation of the financial system. 
Furthermore, the extent, accuracy and availability of the 
information collected by the authorities will determine 
the usefulness of the PCR as part of their toolkit to 
monitor the potential vulnerabilities not only on a 
microprudential level, but also on a macroprudential one.  
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“Yes, the only place on earth where all places 
are, seen from every angle, each standing 
clear, without any confusion or blending”  
 
The full knowledge of a fact sometimes enables 
you to see all at once many supporting but 
previously unsuspected things. 
 




The recent subprime crisis demonstrated that banking supervision and regulation are 
necessary to promote stable financial markets and support economic growth. The 
business of banking entails a wide array of risks, thus the purpose of supervision and 
regulations is that banks be prudently operated amid the associated risks involved.  
 
Banks are by definition highly leveraged in that they operate with a high share of 
borrowed funds. Their ability to function on fractional reserves and the fact that they 
typically transform short-term funding into longer-term credits with greater risk amplify 
their vulnerability. The essence of leveraging borrowed funds to create potential high 
returns on investment creates an element of moral hazard in which the ultimate 
consequence of a negative outcome may not only be borne by the bank  (limited to 
its equity at risk) but by its depositors as well. Besides, banks can also fall prey to 
systemic risks as a result of: i) debt inter-linkages with problem banks; ii) generalized 
bank runs triggered by investor panic; and iii) an asset implosion, causing a 
substantial drop in prices of stocks and/or real estate, as has recently been vividly 
illustrated in the US housing market.  
 
This inherent frailty within the operational function of banks, the fact that they provide 
valuable “public goods” (access to the payment systems, savings intermediation, 
asset transformation, etc.), and the potentially large social costs derived from bank 
failures and spillover effects (into other banks and the real sector as well) motivate 
their regulation and supervision. Such financial distress and crises can come at a 




The vexing events that followed the subprime  crisis triggered a profound and 
comprehensive revision of the conventional approach to regulate and supervise 
financial systems. Championed by the Financial Stability Board and in response to 
the G20 Leaders’ call,
3 international financial institutions, standards setters,   
surveillance bodies, national regulators, and supervisors are elaborating and 
analyzing proposals to fix the features which have seemingly led to (or at least failed 
to prevent) the recent crisis.   
 
                                                 
2 Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2001) find that the cumulative output losses incurred during banking 
crisis periods are large, roughly between 15% and 20%, on average, of annual GDP. BCBS (2010a) 
surveys a wide array of approaches to measuring output costs from financial crises and finds that the 
median estimate of cumulative discounted costs is near 60%. Regarding the current crisis, Haldane 
(2010) estimates that the present value of output losses for the world economy can range between 
90% and 350% of 2009 GDP, depending on what fraction of the 2009 loss is permanent.  
3 As set forth in its Washington Action Plan (see Group of Twenty, 2008) and its Declaration on 
Strengthening the Financial System (see Group of Twenty, 2009).   3
Different working groups underway are addressing a multiplicity of weaknesses and 
loopholes in the conventional paradigm, and fleshing out proposals that will likely be 
introduced in the near term.
4 Amid this effort, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) has developed an array of reforms – some minor, others more 
radical – that will completely overhaul banking sector regulation and supervision. 
Some of these include: introducing a global liquidity standard; imposing larger capital 
requirements on systemically important banks; shifting to forward looking 
provisioning practices; introducing a countercyclical capital framework (i.e. a 
conservation buffer and a countercyclical buffer), and complementing the regulatory 
minimum capital requirements with a leverage ratio that curtails banks’ risk appetite 
during expansions. These amendments, which build on the Revised International 
Capital Framework (Basel II), are being referred to as Basel III. 
 
Necessary as these revisions are, this crisis is rooted in the fact that the basic 
principles of credit risk management were compromised on various levels. As a result 
of accelerated financial innovation, the banks offered new, but opaque, vehicles for 
investment. This made it difficult to assess risk levels and the true extent of credit 
leverage. Thus, as financial institutions began to develop and issue more convoluted 
instruments, credit risk management became more imprecise and at times 
erroneous. Without proper regulatory oversight and amid highly liquid credit markets 
(particularly, facing an infinitely elastic demand of asset backed securities - ABSs - 
and collateralized debt obligations - CDOs - of ABSs), it further enabled banks to 
loosen their lending policies and thus continue taking riskier positions. This set the 
stage for a preeminent collapse as lenient, and at times deceptive, lending practices 
were combined with extreme household exposure (especially to an upside in interest 
rates). And to make matters even worse, bank supervisors and regulators often times 
lacked the appropriate information to readily monitor the developments unfolding in 
the market place.  
 
Credit reporting systems (CRSs) are important institutions in credit markets in that 
they provide a complete picture of an individual or firm’s creditworthiness. Besides 
being important for credit risk management, the availability of high quality and timely 
information on borrowers’ behavior is important for other reasons as well, such as 
developing a “credit culture.” A credit culture facilitates access to credit as it 
addresses the fundamental problem of credit markets: asymmetric information 
between borrowers and lenders, which leads to adverse selection and moral hazard.  
This problem is reduced as credit reporting systems capture current and historical 
lending and payment information. The more accurate, complete and timely 
information that is available in the credit system, the better the lenders are able to 
use credit data to grant credits and monitor their portfolios. One of the most important 
institutional elements supporting a well-functioning credit market is credit reporting 
firms. They are able to provide rapid access to accurate, reliable, and standardized 
information on potential borrowers and are of critical importance in determining risk 
exposure.
5  
                                                 
4 The guidelines that sound financial regulation should observe have been assembled in Brunnermeier 
et al (2009). 
5 The benefits of the sharing of positive and negative information and thus of complete credit reporting 
systems are supported by profuse empirical evidence: see Jappelli and Pagano (1999), Barron and 
Staten (2003) and Majnoni et al (2004). For theoretical developments see Pagano and Padilla (1993) 
and Brown and Zehnder (2005).   4
 
In many countries, central banks or bank superintendences operate public credit 
registries (PCRs). PCRs are databases with detailed information of the credits granted 
by financial intermediaries
6 created to support bank regulation and supervision. On 
occasions they also participate actively in the credit information market by providing 
data to creditors (namely banks) and credit bureaus.
7 The degree of interaction and 
involvement with other CRS
8 players (e.g. financial institutions, other credit providers 
and credit bureaus) varies from country to country. It heavily depends on the 
institutional and legal arrangements that support their operation and on the idiosyncrasy 
of the local credit markets.  
 
Besides its role in improving creditors’ risk assessment and in facilitating access to 
finance, credit information is also an important tool for bank supervisors and 
regulators as watchdogs of financial stability. One of the many lessons this crisis has 
painstakingly taught is the paramount importance that supervisors regularly and 
thoroughly monitor banks’ risk exposure (i.e. at least on a quarterly basis). Being able 
to evaluate the credit risk of borrowers in the financial system gives important 
information to monitor the quality of banks’ portfolios and to shape the prudential 
regulation.  
 
This paper is about the importance of the information in PCRs for supporting and 
improving banking sector regulation and supervision. Bank on-site examinations and 
off-site monitoring can be more efficient and effective when supervisory authorities have 
direct access to credit data, and hence can avoid relying exclusively on bank internal 
databases and regulatory reports. The fact that PCR databases contain individual credit 
information on borrowers makes it possible to implement advanced techniques that 
measure banks’ credit risk exposure. It also allows optimizing the prudential regulation 
ensuring that provisioning and capital requirements are properly calibrated to cover 
expected and unexpected losses respectively.  
 
PCRs will play a role in the adoption of the new International Regulatory Framework 
for Banks (Basel III). The foundations laid down in Basel II remain – to a large extent – 
unchanged.
9 In regards to minimum capital requirements, Basel II introduces model 
based approaches for credit risk
10 (Pillar 1) and requires a thorough assessment of 
                                                 
6 In some countries, financial institutions outside the scope of the central bank or bank 
superintendency regulation report their data to the public credit registries as well. For example, in 
Argentina many credit cards issued by retail stores are reported to the public credit registry operated 
by the Central Bank of Argentina.  
7 It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze the role of PCRs in the credit information market or its 
implications for the dynamics of the (private) credit bureau industry. While the former has been much 
analyzed in the literature on credit information sharing, the latter is to a large extent an unexplored 
field (perhaps with the exception of Negrin (2001), who presents an analysis on the complementarities 
between credit bureaus and public credit registries). 
8 Credit and loan reporting systems are “…the broader institutional framework for credit reporting in an 
economy including existing public and private credit registries, collateral registries, judicial records, 
etc., and the legal and regulatory framework for credit reporting, privacy and consumer protection” 
(WHCRI (2005)). Credit reporting, in turn, refers to the sharing of positive and negative information of 
individuals and firms relevant for making credit decisions. 
9 In July 2009 the BCBS introduced a series of amendments to Basel II, which in particular 
strengthened the treatment of securitizations, both in the banking and in the trading book. See BCBS 
(2009a) and BCBS (2009b).  
10 As well as for operational risk, which is outside the scope of this document.   5
banks’ risk profile by the banks themselves and by their supervisors (Pillar 2). But Basel 
III also brings new duties into the authorities’ agenda, which include identifying 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) – which among other criteria are 
large and highly interconnected – and deciding on the countercyclical capital buffer – 
based on the ratio of credit (bank and non-bank) to GDP. As a result of this, it will be 
highly demanding in information gathering.
11 Despite the fact that only internationally 
active banks of Basel Committee member countries
12 will have to implement Basel III, 
in many other non-BCBS countries supervisors will also adopt it, as has been the case 
with Basel II. For those that do not, international banking groups operating in their 
jurisdictions will likely be implementing the most sophisticated approaches on a global 
basis; hence detailed data will be needed to support the home supervisor.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II explores how PCR data can be used to 
design the prudential regulation for credit risk. Section III describes the role of PCRs in 
bank supervision. Making use of the supervisory responses to the World Bank’s survey 
on credit reporting systems, it exemplifies how supervisors around the globe are taking 
advantage of PCR data to enhance their supervisory process. In Section IV, the paper 
describes how PCRs can support the implementation and supervision of Basel III, while 
Section V explains their importance in steering a broader macro prudential surveillance. 
Having determined the usefulness of PCR data for central banks and bank supervisors, 
Section VI characterizes the desirable features that public credit registries should have. 
Finally, Section VII contains some concluding remarks. 
 
 
II. The role of PCRs in bank regulation 
 
Until Basel III becomes globally widespread and authorities admit the use of banks’ 
internal rating systems, regulatory frameworks for credit risk may not be completely 
aligned to the underlying risk of banks portfolios. However, loan loss provisions 
should be commensurate with expected or average losses, while capital is to cover 
unexpected losses. Bank capital acts as a buffer against unexpected bank risk 
therefore reducing the risk of bank failure and helps to control for moral hazard, 
mitigating the incentives to take excessive risk.  
 
As long as PCRs contain sufficiently long historical data for the largest possible share of 
borrowers in the banking sector, the analysis performed with the information therein 
contained can assist in reshaping the prudential regulation for credit risk. By means of 
diverse data mining and econometric techniques, such as transition matrices and credit 
scoring models, and by deriving loss distributions from credit portfolio models, local 
authorities can better calibrate provisioning ratios and capital requirements to more 
closely reflect expected and unexpected losses for credit risk.  
 
While banks may use their own internal rating systems to manage credit risk,
13 in many 
                                                 
11 For an analysis of the usefulness of credit bureau data in relation to Basel II see, for example, 
Trucharte Artigas (2004). 
12 As of early 2009 the BCBS membership was expanded to include 27 countries: Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
13 For a review of the range of practice regarding internal rating systems of financial institutions from 
G10 countries, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000).   6
jurisdictions they must also rate their borrowers with a mandatory system prescribed by 
the regulator and based only on a few criteria, such as type of credit, days past due and 
projected cash flow.
14 These “prudential ratings” have typically been introduced as a 
means to homogenize the criteria to compute regulatory loan loss provisions and to 
assess the credit quality of different bank portfolios with the same metric, particularly in 
jurisdictions where banks’ rating systems were yet not widespread.
15 Although these 
“prudential rating systems” are not aimed at replacing or competing with banks’ rating 
systems,
16 they can play a subsidiary role. For example, smaller banks may be limited 
in their capacity to develop their own rating systems because of insufficient data, 
experience or resources; in such cases, the prudential ratings could supplement better 
risk analysis. Well constructed regulatory/supervisory rating systems may contribute to 
leveling the playing field in bank risk management practices and at the same time it 
would familiarize less advanced banks with modern credit risk management tools.
17 
Statistical evidence for Argentina in Majnoni et al (2004a) shows that a rating system 
built with PCR data benefits smaller banks with a larger reduction in their loan portfolio 
credit risk, as compared to that observed in bigger banks.  
 
In jurisdictions where mandatory rating systems are in place, transition matrices 
coupled with assumptions regarding recovery rates can indicate to what extent 
provisioning ratios are aligned with average risk. Computing credit portfolio models with 
PCR data can also assist in optimizing the design and calibration of the regulatory 
framework, since they typically yield loss distributions that depict banks’ risk profile.
18 
The output of credit portfolio models can be used to verify that credit loss provisions, 
obtained from applying the supervisory ratios, globally match the estimated expected 
loss and that regulatory capital covers most unexpected losses. Academic attempts to 
perform such comparisons can be found in Balzarotti et al (2002) - with Central Bank of 
Argentina PCR data -, in Cronemberger Parente et al (2004) - with data from the 
Central Bank of Brazil PCR -, and in Jiménez and Mencía (2009) - with data from the 
PCR operated by the Bank of Spain.  
 
 
III. The role of PCRs in bank supervision 
 
Bank supervisors around the world typically adopt risk-based approaches to bank 
supervision. Supervision focuses on assessing banks particular vulnerabilities and the 
                                                 
14 Examples of countries using this approach are Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Panama. 
15 However, in response to the increasingly widespread development and use of rating systems by 
banks, regulators are recognizing those internal ratings to compute loan loss provisions. Hence, when 
banks report their information to the public credit registry they include the internal rating assigned to 
their obligors. 
16 For example, banks’ rating systems must be very granular (i.e. have many rating grades). This is 
necessary to display discriminatory rating power. In turn, to construct such a granular rating system a 
wide array of information is required, both of the credit operations and of the borrowers themselves as 
well. This is particularly important when building rating systems for corporate obligors, who for 
example use information on liquidity and leverage ratios as inputs. This typically exceeds the range of 
information registered at public credit registries, which only collect information on the credits and 
associated collaterals.  
17 Colombia and Mexico pioneered the development of these supervisory rating systems.  
18 In particular, they provide useful information of a loan portfolio loss distribution such as its median, 
its mean (average loss rate, to be covered with total provisions) and different quantiles from the tail of 
the distribution, usually referred to as Value at Risk (VaR). Most importantly, the difference between 
the VaR, typically at the 99.9% confidence level, and the expected loss should be covered with capital.    7
likelihood of failing, while at the same time taking into consideration their systemic 
importance when budgeting the time and resources devoted to their monitoring. The 
information contained in PCRs can be used to enhance those risk-based supervisory 
practices. When bank supervisors have detailed data of bank loans, they can depict a 
more accurate risk profile of bank loan portfolios and perform more efficiently and 
effectively the two dimensions of the supervisory framework: the regular off-site 
monitoring and the less frequent on-site inspections.
19  
 
According to survey data collected by the World Bank between 1999 and 2001,
20 of the 
34 central banks or bank superintendences that had a PCR (of near 60 surveyed), 33 
indicated that PCR data information is used for bank supervision, mainly to determine 
the total indebtedness of borrowers across the system. The PCR data also helped 
supervisors to revise, and when necessary rectify, the classification that financial 
institutions assign to their borrowers.  PCR data also help to evaluate the sufficiency of 
provisions for problem loans, to identify lending trends and to flag banks that had 
significantly increased their exposure to riskier credits. Also, 31 authorities indicated that 
PCR data were reviewed on a periodic basis as a complement to off-site monitoring and 
prior to on-site inspections. When asked how important PCR data were for 
strengthening supervision, 23 central banks/superintendences indicated they were very 




The on-site supervision is a time-tested tool to monitor and assess banks solvency and 
resilience. The results of on-site supervisions are usually translated into a rating. For 
example, initiated by the US supervisors and now also used in other countries,
21 the 
CAMELS rating system yields a composite rating of an institution's overall condition and 
performance by assessing six components: capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management quality, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. Asset evaluation 
is of paramount importance: it measures to what extent the financial institutions are 
exposed to credit risk, usually the most important driver of bank losses which is present 
in the trading book (e.g. in OTC credit derivatives) but most prominently in the loan 
portfolio (broadly defined, including off-balance sheet exposures). These examinations 
can be streamlined using the information in PCRs. 
 
The assessment of bank loan portfolio quality is usually based on samples of 
borrowers. It is not feasible that supervisors conduct a one-by-one review of every 
credit, particularly when dealing with large banks. Although samples of credits can be 
obtained from the banks themselves, they can also be produced with PCR data. By 
knowing beforehand the number and amount of credits that each bank has granted by 
type of borrower, type of credit and risk rating at the minimum, samples can be 
customized and supervisory efforts better allocated. Samples may be stratified to 
ensure representativeness of the banks’ activity in the geographic regions, business 
                                                 
19 On-site inspections and off-site monitoring are closely interrelated components of bank supervision. 
However, for exposition purposes we will here refer to them in separate sub-sections.  
20 World Bank Survey on Public Credit Registry for Central Banks. 
21 Argentina, Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Hong Kong, India and Kenya are a few 
examples of countries that have adopted the CAMEL rating system - or similar approaches - as an 
element of their supervisory toolkit. For a review of the models used by G10 countries, see Sahajwala 
and Van den Bergh (2000).   8
sectors and type of product in which they are active, or tailored to those segments that 
merit closer scrutiny during the visit. For example,  for borrowers whose credit quality 
has deteriorated, banks’ largest obligors and connected borrowers could merit a more 
thorough review. When PCRs register individualized credit operations, they can 
produce samples to evaluate how new credit policies or financial products are impacting 
the bank’s risk profile, and if this is consistent with their credit strategy.  
 
For prudential purposes, in many countries regulatory frameworks set a criteria or 
mandatory rating system that banks must use to risk classify their borrowers and to 
compute loan loss provisions. Increasingly, though, they are allowing banks to use their 
own rating systems for those purposes. At times they require these particular banks to 
map their grades into a single and homogeneous scale that allows performance 
comparisons across banks. In either case, during on-site inspections bank supervisors 
examine the reliability and robustness of banks’ risk rating processes and systems and, 
in particular, whether they are underestimating default risk. Banks’ portfolio samples 
obtained from PCRs should look for inconsistencies or abnormalities in rating systems 
or rogue credit policies.
22 For example, they should flag and track 
refinanced/restructured credits to monitor their payment behavior. It is also helpful that 
samples cross check risk ratings assigned by different banks to the same borrower: 
significant and systematic differences should be deemed abnormal and should trigger 




Bank on-site examinations can be highly demanding in time and resources for both the 
supervisor and the inspected institution, and consequently are conducted at periodically 
timed intervals. Off-site monitoring procedures are thus an efficient aid for an effective 
ongoing supervision, allowing supervisors to monitor banks and observe how their risk 
profile evolves between inspections, with the possibility to promptly identify changes in 
their financial condition. 
 
Besides its usefulness for conducting on-site supervision, PCR data can support 
continuous off-site bank monitoring. PCRs databases can be programmed to produce 
regular, timely supervisory reports (for internal use) containing key risk indicators that 
summarize banks’ exposure to credit risk. At the minimum, they should characterize the 
overall quality of a bank’s portfolio and of its various segments, depicting with particular 
detail the risk profile of the largest borrowers. These reports can also measure bank 
exposure to concentration risk by type of borrower, region, business sector, credit type, 
etc. It is important that they indicate the extent of connected lending and verify banks’ 
compliance with prudential regulation for borrower risk classification.  This can be 
accomplished by comparing the rating for the same borrower in different banks or 
computing transition matrices to benchmark the deterioration of a bank’s portfolio 
relative to other banks. 
 
In recent years, bank supervisors have been modernizing their toolboxes for assessing 
banks’ financial performance and risk profile, adapting diverse credit risk management 
methods that had been introduced or developed by the banking industry. This has 
                                                 
22 When revising a bank rating system, the supervisor may wish to perform some tests of 
discriminatory power and calibration with PCR data to assess the reliability of that model. For further 
details see section below on Basel III.   9
allowed them to instill a quantitative approach to their off-site monitoring, with 
techniques that can summarize large amounts of data into a few quantitative 
assessments. Although the reliance on databases is not a perfect substitution for on-
site supervision, the process for off-site monitoring has particularly been facilitated by 
those jurisdictions that utilize the PCR to produce more reliable and useful estimations 
of bank risk; for example, those that use PCRs in techniques, such as risk assessment 
and early warning systems, credit portfolio models and stress tests, and need detailed 
data on banks credits.  
 
  Supervisory risk assessment and early warning systems. Based to a large 
extent on the experience with credit scoring models and rating systems by the 
banking industry, supervisors developed their own systems to quantify and rank 
banks’ performance in general, and to measure their loan portfolio quality in 
particular. In a review of the supervisory approaches for bank monitoring in G10 
countries, Sahajwala and Van den Bergh (2000) grouped the diverse systems 
into four categories: supervisory bank rating systems, financial ratio and peer 
group analysis systems, comprehensive bank risk assessment systems and 
statistical models.
23 To the extent that credit risk is the major driver of bank 
losses, the ability to count with detailed PCR data enhances the quality of these 
systems and the reliability of their assessments. For example, the off-site rating 
system used at the Bank of Italy (the PATROL rating system)
24 measures credit 
quality and loan concentration with PCR data.  
 
  Bank portfolio credit risk. When monitoring banks and assessing their capacity 
to withstand losses for credit risk, the adequacy of their provisions and capital 
levels can be evaluated by means of transition matrices and portfolio credit risk 
models (CreditRisk+
25, Internal Ratings Based approach - IRB -, etc.) that 
incorporate PCR data. Transition matrices are useful devices to analyze the 
dynamics of portfolio credit risk - they show how borrowers risk grading has 
evolved in the past, what their average default rate has been and how far it has 
deviated from that average (its volatility). Portfolio models also exploit historical 
credit data, but are more efficient in that they better depict loan portfolio loss 
distributions. Either way, these techniques can provide insight as to banks’ ability 
to withstand expected and unexpected losses. They are of particular importance 
in those jurisdictions that have yet to adopt risk based capital and provisioning 
requirements for credit risk.  
 
  Stress tests. Although banks (in particular, large and/or internationally active 
ones) perform stress tests as part of their credit risk management policies, 
central banks and bank supervisors are increasingly performing their own stress 
testing exercises.
26 These supervisory stress tests are designed to gauge the 
                                                 
23 These comprise models for ratings or rating downgrades, survival prediction and expected loss 
models, and others for obtaining early warning signals. 
24 Marullo Reedtz and Trapanese (2000) find empirical evidence for the importance of the information 
in the PCR of the Bank of Italy in building off-site early warning techniques of bank frailty. 
25 CreditRisk+ is a credit portfolio model developed in Credit Suisse First Boston (1997). 
26 When reviewing banks stress tests, supervisors should at the minimum be wary of their results: “A 
few years ago, ahead of the present crisis, the Bank of England and the FSA commenced a series of 
seminars with financial firms, exploring their stress-testing practices. The first meeting of that group 
sticks in my mind. We had asked firms to tell us the sorts of stress which they routinely used for their 
stress-tests. A quick survey suggested these were very modest stresses. We asked why. Perhaps   10
capacity of banks to undergo an extreme, but plausible, financial stress event. 
With respects to credit risk, in general banks losses are modeled as a function of 
bank specific (types of credit, loan portfolio quality and concentration, etc.) and 
macroeconomic variables (GDP growth, unemployment, etc.) behaving in 
accordance with the agreed scenario, which may be deterministic (historical or 
subjective) or stochastic (typically, derived by Monte Carlo). Regardless of how 
the scenarios are assembled, the effect on banks’ loan portfolio quality can be 
obtained with a top-down analysis, directing the impact of the shock to the bank 
portfolio as a whole, or bottom-up, assessing the effect on each market segment 
or business line and aggregating the results across the bank. The latter type of 
analysis is much more precise and detailed, and therefore requires a rich set of 
data. Much of this necessary information is normally collected by PCRs as part 
of their normal operational business procedure. Detailed PCR data can also 
allow supervisors to perform a precise analysis tracing the impact on banks 
largest borrowers, who typically account for a large share of their assets and 
thus may have systemic relevance. In all these cases, detailed loan data will 
allow bank supervisors to better model the impact on banks portfolios of the 
shock as well as banks’ capacity to remain solvent.  
 
These and other off-site techniques require detailed credit information of banks’ loan 
portfolio to evaluate their underlying risk. Although some of these data may be obtained 
from the bank themselves by means of regulatory reports or from the latest on-site 
report, PCRs usually contain updated data of practically all borrowers in the loan 




IV. PCRs and the implementation of Basel III 
 
Published in 1988, the former Basel I Accord became obsolete as the banking 
industry developed new financial products to circumvent its capital requirements.
27 
Most sophisticated larger banks had gone through a rapid evolution of their risk 
management. Financial innovations had found mechanisms to evade or arbitrage 
away the Basel I capital standard, mainly through securitizations, masking the true 
riskiness of the bank. Therefore, there was an increasing debate as to whether 
institutions were adequately capitalized given the nature and extent of the risks they 
were exposed to. With this knowledge, the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision 
issued in 2006 the Revised International Capital Framework (Basel II), attempting to 
better align bank capital requirements to economic risk by associating more precise 
estimates of risks. However, in hindsight, Basel II was ill equipped to handle the new 
                                                                                                                                                          
disaster myopia – disappointing, but perhaps unsurprising? Or network externalities – we understood 
how difficult these were to capture? 
 
No. There was a much simpler explanation according to one of those present. There was absolutely 
no incentive for individuals or teams to run severe stress tests and show these to management. First, 
because if there were such a severe shock, they would very likely lose their bonus and possibly their 
jobs. Second, because in that event the authorities would have to step-in anyway to save a bank and 
others suffering a similar plight.”  (Haldane, 2009). 
27 For small, simple institutions Basel I-based prudential arrangements are probably still suitable. This 
is in fact reflected in Basel II (now part of Basel III), to the extent that the standardized approach is 
similar in its philosophy  to Basel I.   11
financial products that emerged during Basel II’s implementation stage—namely 
CDOs, re-securitizations and securitization liquidity facilities, all of which indirectly led 
to the 2008 crisis. 
 
The new International Regulatory Framework for Banks (Basel III) is the response 
engineered by the BCBS to avoid the repeat of a similar crisis in the future. Basel III 
builds on a refurbished Basel II – enhanced in July 2009 with amendments to its 
three pillars – which is complemented with bold reforms, including: a global liquidity 
standard, a framework for neutralizing externalities imposed by SIFIs and a 
countercyclical capital framework. 
 
Basel III will impose challenges to regulators and supervisors. This is even relevant to 
those that are not Basel Committee member countries and will not adopt it, such as the 
case with host supervisors of banks whose home supervisor adopts Basel III. It 
represents a change to traditional supervision techniques.  In addition to the ordinary 
on-site and off-site supervisory processes, under Pillar 2 supervisors are responsible for 
revising banks validation of their internal rating systems and their assessment of their 
risk profile and capital adequacy.  
 
  Impact studies.  It is important that, prior to migrating to a Basel III-based 
prudential framework, regulators and supervisors simulate the likely effects of its 
implementation. Impact studies are useful to anticipate possible undesired 
outcomes from Basel III, such as its ability to tilt the playing field in financial 




In the run-up to the publication of Basel II, and now to calibrate and refine many of the 
enhancements in Basel III, the BCBS has conducted Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) 
in member jurisdictions. These exercises have been performed bottom-up (i.e. by the 
banks themselves) and their outcomes have been quite detailed. However, it is unclear 
as to what extent the results between financial institutions are totally comparable. The 
possibility that authorities can perform the impact studies themselves (top-down 
approach) should not be discarded as a means to obtaining a readily and consistent, 
although perhaps rough, estimate of the impact of Basel III.  
 
Banks typically report to PCRs their borrowers risk classification, produced either by the 
rules issued by the central bank or bank superintendency, or by their own rating 
system. If further basic information is available such as the type of borrower and credit, 
outstanding debt, residual maturity, type of mitigation securing each credit, simulating 
the impact of adopting Basel III is straightforward.
29  
                                                 
28 Exposures that under Basel I carry an 8% capital requirement, under the IRB approach in Pillar 1 
may experience dramatic shifts in their capital charge. This situation may tilt the playing field between 
Basel I and Basel III banks by shifting the incentives to assign capital to different types of credits. Bank 
regulators should carefully assess the effect on competition in the credit market and on the availability 
of credit. 
29 Bank of Spain conducted several impact assessment exercises with its PCR information. Saurina 
and Trucharte (2004) analyze the impact of Basel II on lending to SMEs, while Saurina and Trucharte 
(2007) assess the effect procyclicality in mortgage portfolios. Repullo, Saurina and Trucharte (2009) 
analyze the procyclicality of Point-in-Time (PIT) and Through-the-Cycle (TTC) rating systems. A study 
on the stability of TTC ratings systems with PCR data of the Central Bank of Argentina can be found in 
Valles (2006).    12
 
  Calibration issues. To what extent the Pillar 1 is properly calibrated is an issue 
for supervisors of non-G10 countries, whose loss experience has not been 
systematically taken into consideration in the architecture of the capital 
framework.  
 
In the case of the simpler, standardized approach, regulators and supervisors will most 
likely need to revise aspects such as the definition of the regulatory retail portfolio. This 
is particularly true for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), in which they will be 
treated as retail borrowers and therefore will receive a lower risk weight than corporate 
obligors. Also the suitability of the supervisory risk weights will need to be reviewed. 
Risk weights of 35% and 75% for residential mortgages and retail credits (including 
eligible SMEs) may be unrealistically low in some jurisdictions. Loan default and 
recovery data stored in PCRs would allow the regulators to assess if the loss 
experience in these credits would warrant that those risk weights should be increased.    
 
Recalibrating the IRB model is a fairly more complex and controversial issue because it 
implies deviating from the new standard in regulatory capital. Policymakers must 
nevertheless bear in mind that its parameters were adjusted to ensure that, when 
applied to G10 banks, IRB results (i.e. unexpected losses) are similar to those obtained 
from conventional credit portfolio models. However, that may not be the case when 
applied to emerging markets banks. Therefore, the impact of the systematic factor on 
borrowers’ creditworthiness (asset correlation), the suitability of the SME definition, the 
adjustment in capital requirements for credits with long maturities and the convenience 
of using a different confidence level (compared to the standard 99.9%) are issues that 
may need be reconsidered by local authorities. This could complicate and lengthen the 
adoption of the Revised International Capital Framework. For example, using 
bootstrapping
30 techniques Majnoni et al (2004b) and Gutierrez Girault (2007) find 
evidence indicating that the IRB formula for corporate obligors may not be properly 
calibrated to unexpected losses in commercial portfolios of banks in certain Latin 
American countries. With data from the Argentine PCR, Balzarotti et al (2004) revised 
how the IRB model might be recalibrated to ensure it appropriately covers credit risk 
losses.  
 
  Validation. Supervisors of banks adopting the IRB approach are expected to 
revise the internal validation of bank rating systems. This revision has a 
qualitative dimension, focused on data quality and rating system use, design and 
documentation, and a quantitative dimension to assess their predictive power. In 
the latter case, and by means of statistical tests (e.g. the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test), graphical tools (e.g. the Cumulative Accuracy Profile or ROC curve) and 
database programming, supervisors can validate these systems with the credit 
information stored at their PCR. Their results can be used to evaluate how the 
discriminatory power of a bank rating system evolves through a business cycle, 
or if different bank’s rating systems concerning the same type of portfolio display 
a significantly different predictive power. PCRs can also be helpful to validate 
banks’ estimates of other risk dimensions required by the IRB. In some countries 
                                                 
30 Given a real portfolio of borrowers that displays certain loss rate, thousands of hypothetical 
portfolios are simulated drawing randomly with replacement borrowers from the real portfolio. For each 
simulated portfolio a loss rate is computed. The resulting simulated loss rates are an empirical 
approximation to the distribution of the loss rate for that type of portfolio.    13
(e.g. Mexico and Panama) PCRs collect, for each credit, date of origination, 
contractual maturity and amortizing profile, and register the occurrence of early 
amortizations. With this information the effective maturity for different credit lines 
can be estimated. Also, it is quite simple to track and analyze the behavior of 
borrowers’ balances prior to the event of default, and hence estimate the 
exposure at default of credit lines at different banks. 
 
Bank deviation from the IRB underlying assumptions should also be of concern for bank 
supervisors, and some of them can be addressed with PCR data. The IRB approach 
relies on the assumption that banks portfolios are perfectly granular and have therefore 
diversified away all the idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, it is important that supervisors 
inspect that loan portfolios are sufficiently fine grained (for example, computing a 
Herfindahl index). Consideration should be given to adopting corrective measures, for 
example with granularity add-ons that adjust capital requirements for undiversified 
idiosyncratic risk (Gordy, 2002). However, Tarashev and Zhu (2008) show that a 
violation to perfect granularity has a more limited impact on IRB measures of risk than a 
deficient calibration of the IRB model, resulting for example from wrong asset 
correlations. 
 
The possibility to perform these exercises on an off-site fashion without using bank 
internal data facilitates the supervisory assessment of their internal rating systems. 
 
  Auxiliary rating systems. Whether to level the playing field in the banking 
sector or to facilitate banks gradual adoption of more advanced risk 
management tools, supervisors can use PCR data to build risk rating systems 
themselves. These can be provided to those banks that are unable or unwilling 
to develop their own systems (for example because they lack sufficient historical 
data, resources or experience). They can also be used by the supervisors to 
benchmark banks’ internal rating systems; for example, flagging those borrowers 
who are rated abnormally well.  
 
The macroprudential revolution in Basel III 
 
The traditional approach to banking sector regulation and supervision has been 
predominantly microeconomic, mainly concerned with stand-alone bank solvency, 
implicitly assuming that the stability of the financial sector was a by-product obtained 
by “aggregation.” This philosophy was rooted in Basel II.  
 
In the last years, though, regulations and supervisory policies have been 
incorporating elements of a complementary, macroprudential approach, principally 
concerned with overall macroeconomic stability. This approach is characterized as 
having two perspectives:
31 i) a time dimension, that tries to mitigate the natural pro-
cyclicality of banking systems due to feedback/second round effects between the 
financial and the real sectors of the economy and ii) a cross sectional dimension, 
which addresses systemically important institutions and their inter-linkages and 
spillovers that are key drivers of domino problems in banks. Basel III reflects a policy 
shift towards this pronged approach; focused not only on bank solvency but also on 
macroeconomic stability. 
                                                 
31 For an analysis on the distinction between the macro and microprudential perspectives, see Borio 
(2003).    14
 
  Countercyclical buffer decisions. The countercyclical capital framework is a 
stellar enhancement in Basel III; it crystallizes the BCBS effort to introduce a 
macroprudential layer in banking sector regulation. In particular, this mechanism 
attempts to make banking sector less pro-cyclical, and is composed of two 
elements. First, a capital conservation buffer to ensure banks hold a capital 
reservoir that can be used to absorb losses during periods of stress while still 
being above the minimum capital requirements. This buffer, set at 2.5% of 
banks’ risk weighted assets (RWAs), will require profit retention in banks with 
capital ratios that do not meet this excess capital. The second element, the 
countercyclical capital buffer, has been engineered to address junctures of 
excess – and potentially destabilizing – credit growth. In practice, it amplifies the 
conservation buffer, leading banks to increase their capital ratios and lean 
against the build-up phase of the credit cycle.
32 
 
The countercyclical buffer will, in a given jurisdiction, be zero most of the times. Local 
authorities (e.g. the banking sector supervisor) will “activate” this add-on, and hence 
expand the conservation buffer when they judge there is potential evidence of a 
destabilizing trend in credit growth. The BCBS envisages a common reference guide – 
based on the deviations in credit-to-GDP from its trend – to aid supervisors in their 
judgment. But it also recognizes that they may inform their decisions with further 
variables which can be useful indicators of rising tensions in the credit market. Some of 
these include interest rates, collateral valuations, delinquency rates and other variables 
commonly encountered in complete PCRs. For example, to the extent that PCRs have 
information about credits origination date, a simple vintage analysis
33 can indicate if 
credits that have recently been granted are displaying an abnormally high delinquency 
rate. This, for example, could lead to conclude the convenience of activating the 
countercyclical add-on. 
 
  Evaluation of systemic importance. Recognizing that the macroprudential 
approach has also an important cross-section aspect, Basel III will also include 
particular – more stringent – provisions for Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions (SIFIs). A precondition for such a framework is counting with sound 
elements for their identification.  
 
PCRs can provide a valuable input for measuring the degree of systemic importance of 
banks that, as a result of their size, inter-linkages or lack of substitutability, must be 
more conservatively regulated and intensively supervised. Examples include banks that 
are the unique creditors of certain geographic regions or business sectors, or are 
extensively interconnected with other financial institutions.  
 
 
                                                 
32 For a thorough explanation of the mechanics of the countercyclical capital framework, see BCBS 
(2010b). 
33 Vintage analysis partitions the credit portfolio by date of origination and compares the evolution of 
the respective cumulative delinquency rates – i.e. delinquency maturation curves –. The steeper a 
curve is towards delinquency, the riskier the vintage is. If recent vintages display a steeper pattern, 
they can be indicating deterioration in lending standards or in the credit environment. This kind of 
analysis is typically used as a portfolio management tool in the banking industry, but should also be 
used by bank supervisors and can be readily performed with PCR data.   15
V. A broader macroprudential surveillance  
 
As lessons began to emerge from the current crisis, the G20 leaders envisioned a 
redesign of the regulatory and supervisory frameworks for financial systems. As part of 
the redesign, suggested principles include a heightened micro level supervision 
supplemented by a macro prudential framework that requires a more inclusive 
approach to credit supervision. Embodied in Basel III, this ultimately would promote 
more prudent risk taking and a more accurate reflection of system-wide credit leverage 
in the banking sector.  
 
However, the necessity for a wider oversight scope has become more evident in light of 
the current global financial crisis, where seeds of the crisis were sowed outside the 
banking sector.   
 
  The scope of prudential oversight. Besides banks, the stability of financial 
systems is also affected by the operations of other creditors that are seldom 
regulated and supervised. The genesis of the subprime crisis has raised 
awareness on the systemic importance of “shadow banking systems.” However, 
other sources of non-bank credit that “shadow” the banking system can be as 
important in other latitudes. For example, in some countries of Latin America this 
is evident by considering large retail stores disbursing lines of credit, which at 
times comprise a large segment of the credit market and that is neither regulated 
nor subject to oversight. Although they do not intermediate deposits, they are 
interconnected with the financial system through a variety of channels:  
i.  They obtain loans from the banking sector. 
ii.  They fund indirectly from the banking sector, when banks hold significant 
portions of their commercial papers or securitization tranches; these 
securities are backed by pools of credits granted with unknown credit 
standards. 
iii.  When banks act as underwriters or enhancers of their securitizations 
(exposing banks to more subtle, although not least important, types of risks). 
iv.  Since they provide credit to banks borrowers, particularly families, typically by 
issuing their own non-bank credit cards.  
 
On the ground of potential spillover effects and to shed more transparency in this area, 
PCRs could include credit data from large non-bank creditors. Although they do not fall 
under the sphere of bank regulators and supervisors, preliminary lessons of the current 
crisis suggest that the scope of financial regulation should be widened to account for 
the operations of non-bank systemic players. These non-bank creditors may overstretch 
the repayment capacity of bank borrowers, making the banking sector vulnerable to 
their credit policies. This is of paramount importance if they are heavily intertwined with 
their activity as creditors, sponsors, investors or enhancers of their ABSs.   
 
  Macroprudential indicators. In addition to serving the supervisors’ need to 
monitor an array of indicators that summarize bank’s financial and economic 
condition, indicators must also be constructed to monitor the stability of the 
overall financial system.  
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A set of “systemic early warning indicators” would allow supervisors to detect, monitor 
and address the buildup of vulnerabilities that may otherwise become a source of 
financial and economic distress in the future. Examples of these are the extent to which 
households are overstretching their repayment capacity, or exposed to interest or 
currency risk. This is especially relevant for banks actively involved in cross-border 
lending.  
 
  Systemically important borrowers. PCRs should be used to detecting and 
monitoring systemically important borrowers (e.g. the largest borrowers of the 
financial system, typically accounting for a large share of total credit in the 
economy). Much of the traditional toolkit used in the off-site supervision, such as 
early warning indicators and stress tests, is being revisited and adapted to take 
into consideration the potential spillover effects imposed by these obligors. 
 
 
VI. Optimal PCR architecture 
 
In the preceding sections we explored how PCR data can be best used to strengthen 
banking sector regulation and supervision and to monitor the global performance of the 
credit market. It is therefore important that PCRs contain accurate, timely and sufficient 
data to those purposes. They should be able to provide timely information of each 
borrower (i.e. full name and ID number, address or location, type of obligor - household, 
SME or corporate obligor) and for each of their corresponding credits (i.e. type of credit, 
outstanding debt, days past due, date of origination and contractual maturity, type of 
interest rate and currency of the credit). Information of any risk mitigation measures 
securing the credits (e.g. credit derivatives, guarantors, financial collateral) is useful to 
estimate the severity of losses in the event of default and is of paramount importance to 
support supervisors in jurisdictions admitting the use of IRB models, particularly to 
estimate or revise banks’ Loss Given Default (LGD) estimates. Figure 1 depicts in more 
detail the basic set of information that PCRs should contain. 
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Figure 1. Minimum set of information that a PCR should contain 
 
Their coverage should be as wide as possible: PCRs must receive data from all the 
financial intermediaries (i.e. the regulated financial system). Local authorities must 
consider if there are other creditors that, although not being financial intermediaries, 
must also report on the ground of their systemic importance and macroprudential 
concerns (e.g. large retail stores, microfinance institutions, credit cooperatives, etc.). 
And the concept of credit should also be broad to ensure collecting all operations with 
credit characteristics: all sorts of outstanding financings should be reported, both on-
balance and off-balance (e.g. unused revolving credit lines, securitization liquidity 
facilities and other contingent liabilities such as financial guarantees and credit 
derivatives). This includes credits spun off to asset pools backing ABSs, CDOs and 
other complex structures. It is important that the design of PCRs is flexible: their layout 
and information requirements must be constantly revised to ensure new forms of credit 
can be monitored with the information therein contained. 
 
The ability to collect information on the credits underlying structured assets is of 
paramount importance, particularly when there is uncertainty as to what is the best way 
to assess the risk of those structures. For example, by looking-through into the risk 
profile of the underlying credits (i.e. having information on the types of borrowers, types 
of credits, maturities and interest rates of the claims, associated collateral, number of 
obligors and extent of portfolio concentration in the asset pool) and knowing how the 
structures have been designed (e.g. number of tranches to a securitization and 
amounts associated) it is more feasible to model the risk profile of those structures (e.g. 
ABSs, CDOs) and thus benchmark external ratings attached to them, such as those 
produced by the credit rating agencies.  
Information on the Borrower
(including each cosigner) 
 
 Name  
 ID number 
 Economic group’s name (if belongs to 
one) 
 Business activity  
 Region or country  
 Type of borrower 
 Size  
 Rating – Internal Model 
 If connected to the bank, the type of 
connection 
Information on the Credit 
 
 Credit’s internal number 
 Purpose or type of credit 
 Date of origination 
 Contractual maturity (date the credit will be completely repaid) 
 Currency 
 Amount outstanding (if revolving: drawn amount) 
 Initial amount (if revolving: authorized limit) 
 Interest rate 
 Days past due 
 Indicate if the credit is considered to be in default. 
 Indicate if the credit has been refinanced 
 Risk rating (of the borrower or the credit) 
 Include “transversality indicator”: before a borrower ceases to be 
reported (for example, the last month it is reported), indicate the 
reason (write-off, matured, securitized, etc.)  
 
Credit Risk Mitigation 
 Type: guarantee, collateral, credit risk derivative, on-balance 
sheet netting agreement 
 Amount 
 Date of last valuation 
 Valuation 
 Seniority 
 Risk rating of the guarantor or protection seller   
Information on the Creditor 
 
 In case of syndicated loans, all the 
creditors must be identified. 
 In case of credits sold to another 
bank or securitized: both the 
originating bank and the 
bank/structure holding the credit 
should be identified. In these cases, 
some basic features of the structure 
should also be collected.   18
 
In some cases, PCRs impose a floor for the credits that are to be reported. This leaves 
unregistered a large number of borrowers that account for a small share of bank credit. 
While these floors prevent the databases from ballooning, by systematically excluding 
small debt data (e.g. microcredit data) they impose a censoring on the database that 
may undermine the reliability of some of the analysis performed. In the end, operators 
of the PCR need to strike a balance between the advantages of a complete picture of 
the credit market with the challenge that an enlarged PCR may impose (e.g. the 
potentially higher marginal cost and time implications of collecting and managing 
smaller credit information by both the banks
34 and regulators/supervisors).   
 
Given the need to strike a balance, PCRs can outweigh such costs undertaken by 
banks by providing them with credit information that can facilitate their credit risk 
management practices. This is of particular importance when PCRs are the only source 
of positive information in the credit information market, since in some countries private 
credit bureaus are nonexistent or unable to obtain and distribute positive information. In 
these cases, by downscaling PCRs, lower income borrowers are able to demonstrate 
their payment behavior.   
 
 
VII. Concluding remarks 
 
Much of the recent literature in banking and financial stability topics has addressed the 
causes of the subprime crisis. In some cases, the literature highlights the flaws and 
loopholes of rigid regulations and supervisory processes that failed to react to the 
imbalances and vulnerabilities as they built up in the preface of the crisis. Other 
literature stresses the psychological drivers of the subprime crisis; analyzing how 
borrowers embarked into a borrowing frenzy fueled by myopic investors and insufficient 
knowledge of ABSs and CDOs. Once the crisis was rolling, the panic in the market 
place also played a prominent role. In all these factors some sort of informational 
vacuum was present: the extent to which households had overstretched their 
repayment capacity and their exposure to an upside in interest rates, banks holdings of 
equity tranches of securitizations and their off-balance sheet exposure to securitization 
conduits (i.e. liquidity facilities), banks concentration to certain protection sellers, and 
protection sellers concentration to subprime mortgages. 
 
Alas, although regulatory and supervisory frameworks are being enhanced with the 
lessons learnt, the financial industry will likely find ways (i.e. new instruments) to 
circumvent the improved regulatory fence. And while the authorities are willing to 
embrace a macroprudential approach to financial system oversight, its ability to 
neutralize the pro-cyclical nature of banking systems and to unwind market manias, are 
still uncharted waters. Financial crisis have been frequent in the past and, unfortunately, 
they will likely repeat in the future. 
 
Against this backdrop, the importance of complete, accurate and timely information on 
the credits in the financial system is evident. Both in normal times and during crises, 
                                                 
34 Reporting institutions - particularly smaller ones - may also benefit from having to report to PCRs, to 
the extent that it requires that they collect and organize data on their credit exposures. In these cases, 
regulatory/supervisory reporting requirements operate as a guide to building their internal databases 
for credit risk management purposes.   19
authorities need a device that allows them to look at the universe of credits in a detailed 
and readily way. And more importantly, they need to develop tools that exploit as much 
as possible the information therein contained. In this respect, it is envisioned that the 
existence of a PCR will be a key factor to enhance the supervision and regulation of the 
financial system. The extent, accuracy and availability of the information collected by 
the authorities will determine the usefulness of the PCR as part of their toolkit to monitor 
the potential vulnerabilities not only on a microprudential, but also on a macroprudential 
perspective. 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
ABS  Asset Backed Security 
BCBS  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Basel II  Revised International Capital Framework 
Basel III  International Regulatory Framework for Banks 
CDO  Collateralized Debt Obligation 
CEMLA  Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos 
CRS  Credit Reporting System 
FSA Financial  Services  Authority 
GDP Gross  Domestic  Product 
G10   Group of Ten Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
G20   Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
ID Personal  Identification 
IRB  Internal Rating Based 
LGD  Loss Given Default 
OTC Over-the-Counter 
PCR  Public Credit Registry 
PD  Probability of Default 
PIT Point-in-Time 
QIS  Quantitative Impact Study 
ROC  Receiver Operating Characteristic 
RWA Risk  Weighted  Asset 
SIFI  Systemically Important Financial Institution 
SME  Small and Medium Enterprise 
TTC Through-the-Cycle 
VaR  Value at Risk 
WB World  Bank 
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